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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mental health professionals face an ethical predicament when the duty
to maintain patient confidentiality conflicts with the duty to promote the
welfare of others. There would be no conflict if a clinician's duty extended
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only to his patients, but the obligation has been broadened to include a protective duty toward third parties in certain circumstances. 1 When a psychiatric patient during the course of treatment expresses a serious and credible
intention to harm an identifiable third party, the clinician to whom the
threat was voiced is placed on the horns of a dilemma: the therapist must
decide how to best protect the intended victim while remaining mindful of
the obligation to maintain confidentiality. a The decision is fraught with
possible adverse consequences, both as a result of a breach of confidentiality 3 and as a result of failing to take adequate measures to protect the intended victim from the patient's violent impulses. 4 The clinician must decide "whether more harm is done by occasionally breaching confidentiality
or by always respecting it regardless of the consequences." 5 In many cases,
the laws governing confidentiality and protection of the public, as currently
interpreted, understood, and enforced, place clinicians in a position where
they are legally required to violate the confidence that they believe to be
their overriding professional
obligation in favor of a protective duty toward
6
potential victims.
Breaches of confidentiality can erode the therapeutic relationship or
lead to an increase in violence when patients terminate treatment after a
breach of confidence or withhold information that is necessary for effective
treatment due to fears of compromised confidentiality.7 Equally serious,
however, is the confusion among mental health professionals about what
measures can and should be taken in fulfilling their duty to protect third
parties and the potential 8 for unnecessary breaches of confidentiality in response to this confusion.
1. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public Peril Begins": 25
Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 213 (2000); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-46 (Cal. 1976).
2.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (noting
social policy as the basis for resolving the tension between the conflicting duties to the patient and the public).
3. Id. at 347 (acknowledging that disclosures of confidential information have the
potential to disrupt the therapeutic relationship).
4. Id. ("The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to
pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved.").
5.
Michael H. Kottow, Medical Confidentiality: An Intransigent and Absolute
Obligation, 12 J. MED. ETHICS 117, 117 (1986).
6. Id. at 118.
7.
Buckner & Firestone, supra note 1, at 214 (discussing a commentary on the
Tarasoff decision in which it was postulated that fear of breaches of confidentiality might
chill the therapeutic dialogue) (citing Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapiststo Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REv. 358, 378 n.52 (1976)).
8. Id. ("The ill-defined nature of the duty to protect has led to great confusion
about clinicians' obligations [with] therapists ...overreacting to Tarasoff and its progeny in
an effort to protect threatened victims.") (citing Paul S. Appelbaum, Howard Zonana, Rich-
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This article begins, in part II, with general background on the duties of
mental health professionals to their patients and to the public and on the
landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,9 which
raised public awareness of the tension between these duties.' 0 Part III contains a more thorough analysis of the duty of patient confidentiality and the
limits to that duty in the form of protecting third parties. Part IV represents
an examination of the legislative, psychiatric, and judicial responses to the
confidentiality/public protection dilemma. Finally, part V focuses on the
laws in Illinois. Specifically, the Illinois statutes may cause unnecessary
confusion regarding a clinician's duty, regarding the events that trigger the
duty, and regarding the acceptable methods of fulfilling the duty. 1 Furthermore, Illinois laws have been judicially interpreted and applied in ways
that may exacerbate the problems by leaving classes of potential victims
unprotected or by causing unnecessary breaches of confidentiality. 12 However, these difficulties are not insurmountable. 13 There are possible improvements, both in wording and in application, of the Illinois statutes that
may bring Illinois closer to achieving
the requisite balance between patient
14
privilege and public protection.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

OVERVIEW

The American Medical Association recognizes the dual duties of mental health professionals-to protect the rights of their patients, as well as to
protect members of the public from the violent impulses of their patientsand also recognizes the necessity for exceptions to patient confidentiality
created by these conflicting duties. 15 The 1976 California Supreme Court
ard Bonnie & Loren H. Roth, Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists' Liabilityfor
Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 821 (1989)).
9.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. App. 1973), vacated, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
10.
Id. at 880.
11.
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the inconsistencies between the wording of the two Illinois statutes, as well as the lack of uniformity and predictability of judicial
interpretation of the statutes).
12.
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the specific problems related to judicial
interpretation and application of the Illinois statutes).
13.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
14.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
15.
Dudley Stewart, In Defense of Exceptions to Confidentiality, 5 VIRTUAL
MENTOR

AM.

MED.

ASS'N

J.

ETHics,

Oct.

2003,

http://virtualmentor.ama-

assn.org/2003/10/hlawl-0310.html (explaining that the duty of confidentiality in the psychotherapeutic relationship is subject to exceptions when the safety of third parties is jeopardized by a violent patient).
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decision in Tarasof1 6 has fundamentally influenced currently accepted
principles relating to the ethics of patient confidentiality within the psychiatric setting.17 More than thirty years after the decision, the case remains
relevant not just in California but in the many jurisdictions that have since
followed it, with numerous courts citing Tarasoffas an important case and
relying on its reasoning as a basis for their decisions. 18 Even the Supreme
Court of the United States, in explaining that there are instances in which
publication of otherwise privileged material is allowable, used Tarasoff as
its example of the exception to psychiatric confidentiality when public
safety is at issue.1 9 Therefore, a thorough analysis of the laws relating to
patient confidentiality and their limits and exceptions in cases of danger to
the public must begin with a review of Tarasoff,the "first case to find that a
mental health professional may have a duty to protect others from possible
harm by their patients. 2 °
B.

TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prosenjit Poddar met Tatiana Tarasoff in 1968 at the University of
California at Berkeley, where they were both graduate students. 2 1 Poddar
was romantically interested in Tarasoff but became depressed and despondent when the feelings were not mutual. 22 Poddar sought outpatient counseling with Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist at Cowell Memorial Hospital, located at the university.23 During a therapy session on August 18,
16.
17.

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal. 1976).
See Kenneth Kipnis, In Defense of Absolute Confidentiality, 5 VIRTUAL MENTOR
AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS, Oct. 2003, http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2003/10/hlaw20310.html ("The conventional wisdom on the ethics of medical confidentiality has been
largely shaped by the Tarasoff case."); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Alan Rosenbaum,
Tarasoffand the Researcher: Does the Duty to ProtectApply in the Research Setting?, AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST, June 1989, at 885 (explaining that the legal duty of mental health providers
to protect third parties began with the Tarasoff case).
18.
See, e.g., Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (M.D.N.C. 1986)
("[Tarasoff is] the seminal case in this area, and the case from which all courts examining a
duty to commit have begun their examination."); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1336
(D. Colo. 1983) ("[Tarasoff is] the leading case on a therapist's liability for the violent actions of a patient ....");Charleston v. Larson, 696 N.E.2d 793, 798 (I11.
App. Ct. 1998)
("[Tarasoffis a] leading case encompassing the issue of special relationships."); Emerich v.
Phila. Ctr. for Human Dev., 720 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 1998) ("Our analysis must begin with
the California Supreme Court's landmark decision in Tarasoff.
19.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539 (2001).
20. Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1036.
21.
People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974).
22.
Id.
23.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973), vacated, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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1969, Poddar confided in Dr. Moore that he wanted to kill "an unnamed
girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned home to
Berkeley from Brazil. 24 Moore notified campus police that he believed
Poddar was capable of harming himself or someone else and asked police to
transport Poddar to a nearby hospital for seventy-two-hour emergency detention and evaluation.2 5 Campus police detained Poddar and questioned
him, but they released him after they found him to be rational and willing to
stay away from Tarasoff. 26 On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Tarasoff's
home armed with a pellet gun and a kitchen knife.27 He shot Tarasoff with
the pellet gun and when she ran from the house, he pursued her, repeatedly
and fatally stabbing her.28
Poddar was convicted of second degree murder, but his conviction was
overturned on appeal because of a prejudicial error in the jury instructions.2 9 Although the case was remanded, Poddar was never actually retried,
possibly because of the length of time that had elapsed since the murder and
the resultant difficulty in recalling witnesses and reconstructing evidence;
instead, Poddar was released on the condition that he return to India.3 °
Tatiana's parents, Vitaly and Lydia Tarasoff, filed a wrongful death
action against the university regents, the psychologist, the supervising psychiatrists, and the police. 3 1 The causes of action for "failure to detain a dangerous patient" and for "breach of primary duty to [the] patient and the public" were barred by governmental immunity. 32 The cause for "failure to
warn on a dangerous patient" 33 found no protection in governmental immunity since the court held that only basic policy decisions were included in
34
the category of discretionary functions protected from liability in tort.

Over the strenuous objections of amici representing the American Psychiatric Association, the court found that "the therapist owes a 3legal duty not
only to his patient, but also to his patient's would-be victim.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. 1974).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 350. The defense requested several jury instructions related to the insanity
defense. Id. The court refused one requested instruction, the absence of which reasonably
could have caused the jury to find malice without properly considering evidence of the effect
of diminished mental capacity on the "awareness of duty" and "acting despite the awareness" prongs of the implied malice test. Id.

30.
CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT
CASES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 60 (2006).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 345-46.
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The court elaborated on the principle that the duty to third parties is
necessarily limited to situations in which harm to the third party is foreseeable.36 However, the court added the vital caveat that when foreseeable
harm may be avoided only by controlling the conduct of the would-be aggressor, the common law traditionally had imposed liability only when the
defendant was in a position of a "special relationship" to the dangerous
person or to the intended victim.37 The "special relationship" requirement
represents an exception to the principle that there is no general duty to
come to the aid of another person.3 8 That is, a special relationship to the
aggressor or to the intended victim creates a duty to control the actions of
the aggressor or creates a right to protection in the would-be victim. 39 Examples of common relationships cited in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as imposing a duty to control the actions of another person include parentchild and master-servant, among others. 40
Although the doctor-patient relationship was not specifically mentioned in the Restatement, the court pointed out that a doctor necessarily is
required to "exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating from the patient's illness" in cases of contagious disease 41 and that
other courts had imposed liability for harm to third parties based solely on
the therapist-patient relationship in the absence of any special relationship
with the victim. 42 This reasoning led to the court's presumption that the
doctor-patient relationship falls under the category of "special relationships" that require the doctor to take responsibility "for the safety, not only
of the patient himself, but also of any third-person whom the doctor knows
to be threatened by the patient., 43 Having extended "special relationship"
status to the therapist-patient relationship, the court concluded that a patient's right to confidentiality is necessarily limited to the degree necessary
to protect the public from danger, asserting that "[t]he protective privilege
ends where the public peril begins. ' 44

36.
37.

38.

Id. at 342.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342-43 (Cal. 1976).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 314 (1965).

39.
ld. § 315.
40.
Id. §§ 316-17.
41.
Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 344.
42.
Id. (referring to the holding in Merch. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Fargo v. United
States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967)).
43.
Id. (quoting John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, Note, The Patient or His
Victim: The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1030 (1974)).
44.
Id. at 347.
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II.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING DUTIES

PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

The principal of confidentiality is the basis on which therapeutic trust
is built within the setting of medical treatment in general and mental health
treatment in particular.45 The promise of confidentiality allows patients to
feel safe in giving true, complete, and uncensored versions of the information that they share with their physicians, whereas the possibility of
breaches of this trust may seriously impair effective treatment.46
1.

ParticularImportance of Confidentiality in the Mental Health Treatment Setting

Despite the biological basis of many psychiatric disorders, mental illnesses are not as easily detected and measured via physical examination or
diagnostic tests as are other types of physical illnesses, making complete
disclosure by the patient especially vital to accurate diagnosis and treatment.4 7 Within the setting of psychotherapy, effective treatment is
based on a collaboration between the therapist and the nonpathologic (or "healthy") aspects of the patient's personality. To attain this collaborative stance, the therapist attempts to see the world through the patient's eyes, striving
for a state of empathic rapport. At the same time, .

. the

therapist must inevitably work in opposition to the pathologic (or "sick") aspects of the patient's psyche .

. . ,

in ef-

fect acting as an advocate for the healthy side of the patient.

45.
Id. at 354 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Until today's majority opinion, both legal and
medical authorities have agreed that confidentiality is essential to effectively treat the mentally ill....").
46.
Id. at 359 ("[A]ssurance that the confidential relationship will not be breached is
necessary to maintain his trust in his psychiatrist-the very means by which treatment is
effected.").

47.
See generally Boadie W. Dunlop & Anne L. Dunlop, Counseling via Analogy:
Improving Patient Adherence in Major Depressive Disorder,7 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 300, 301-02 (2005) (discussing the need to encourage patient discussion of mental health symptoms with primary care physicians by analogizing depression
to other biologically-based illnesses, such as diabetes and hypertension).
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The foregoing requires from the patient an openness
in self-disclosure and comfort with candor, in respect to
which the clinician owes the protection of confidentiality.48
Unfortunately, psychiatric care still carries with it a great deal of social
stigma,49 causing many patients to feel ambivalent about seeking treatment
for emotional problems.5 ° In addition to the sense of shame associated with
having a psychiatric disorder, the issues about which individuals consult
psychiatrists and psychologists have the potential to cause embarrassment
or disgrace if not kept in strict confidence. 51 Consequently, "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment., 52 Worse, the reticence about discussing psychiatric symptoms may lead to avoidance of treatment altogether if patients fear that their disclosures may become public. 53 Courts
have acknowledged the particularly sensitive nature of psychiatric records
and have protected the contents of those records when the patient's interest
in maintaining confidentiality outweighs any evidentiary benefit that might
be gained from compelling disclosure. 54 It is significant to note that even in
states in which there is no privilege for communications between general
physicians and patients, such a privilege is statutorily extended to communications between mental health professionals and their patients. 55 As one
court noted,
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special
need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to
help his patients is completely dependent upon
their willingness and ability to talk freely. This
makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communica48.

THOMAS

G.

GUTHEIL &

PAUL S.

PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 16 (4th ed. 2006).

APPELBAUM,

CLINICAL HANDBOOK

OF

49.
Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 359 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
50.
GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 18.
51.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
52.
Id.
53.
GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 18.
54.
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (refusing to compel disclosure of a
therapist's records for defendant police officer, who underwent therapy to cope with the
effects of trauma after the officer shot and killed a man, in an action brought by the administrator of the estate of the victim because ample eyewitness testimony could provide sufficient evidence); Wiles v. Wiles, 448 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 1994) (upholding the lower court's
decision to grant a motion to quash a subpoena for psychiatric records when both the patient
and the doctor asserted privilege).
55.
Wiles, 448 S.E.2d at 682.
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tion. . . .56A threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment.
Although a breach of doctor-patient confidentiality is serious and possibly damaging in any medical context, disclosure of the sensitive, private,
and potentially embarrassing information that is the source of many psychiatric problems can have even more deleterious effects.
2.

PotentialAdverse Consequences of Breaches of Confidentiality

It is posited that breaches of confidentiality will "undermine the patient's trust of the therapist, deter the patient from taking advantage of
treatment, and deprive the patient and society of the beneficial effects of
psychiatric interventions. 5 7 Furthermore, there exists a potential adverse
impact on the patient's illness if trust in the confidential nature of the therapeutic environment is lacking. 58 For example, in the absence of an assurance of confidentiality, individuals who need psychiatric treatment may be
deterred altogether from seeking necessary care. 59 If a patient begins treatment but becomes fearful that his confidence will be breached, he may distort or fabricate information or may fail to fully disclose all the information
necessary to make an accurate diagnosis, any of which would inhibit effective treatment. 60 Furthermore, "even if full disclosure is accomplished, assurance that the confidential relationship will not6 be breached is necessary
to maintain the patient's trust of his psychiatrist." '
Openness in the therapeutic environment is especially important when
a patient is struggling with aggressive urges. It is argued that any decreased
likelihood that a patient will reveal information about violent feelings, in
turn, increases the likelihood that the patient will act on the violent impulses in the absence of the clinician's opportunity to treat the underlying
psychiatric disorder. 62 For example, there are some who argue that the Ta56.
Id. at 683 (quoting KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98,
at 370 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
Jerome S. Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 273, 277
57.
(1984).
Id. ("[A]ny evidence of breach of confidentiality will... deprive the patient and
58.
society of the beneficial effects of psychiatric interventions."); see also Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 566 (Cal. 1974) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting the importance
of psychiatric treatment and the necessity for assurances of confidentiality in successful
therapeutic interventions), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
59.
Beigler, supra note 57, at 277-78.
60.
Kottow, supra note 5, at 118 (noting that any impairments in physician-patient
communication may "render the patient's medical care less than optimal").
61.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 567 (Cal. 1974), vacated,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
62.
Kipnis, supra note 17.
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rasoff case may have had a less-tragic outcome for Tatiana if Dr. Moore
had not breached confidentiality by alerting campus police to Poddar's
threats of violence. 63 That is, if Poddar had not been picked up by the police
at Dr. Moore's request, it is posited that he might have continued his treatment, dealt with his angry and violent impulses in the therapeutic setting,
and never acted on such impulses. 64 Although this alternative ending to
Tarasoff can never be predicted with any degree of accuracy, the mere possibility of a different result in the absence of the breach should be enough to
underscore the importance of trust in the therapeutic setting and the potentially devastating consequences when patients withhold information because of the fear of disclosure.
The duty to protect society from violent patients has purportedly complicated mental health treatment at the very least and possibly even impaired its effectiveness due to the therapist's fear of legal repercussions that
could result from both a failure to take protective measures against a credible threat and from an overreactive warning based on a noncredible threat.65
Confusion over the protective duty can impair a therapist's ability to effectively treat a patient when the focus shifts from the patient's problems to
the therapist's duty and potential liability. 66 When this interference with the
therapeutic process is sufficiently disruptive, it may lead to termination of
therapy.6 7 The shift in focus from therapeutic to legal intervention has at
times extended to other areas of mental health treatment with potentially
devastating consequences to patients who need help. For example, during
the first several years after the Tarasoff decision, staff members of a California suicide prevention hotline were advised that any calls involving serious potential threats to others "would be responded to first by trying to
learn the identity of the threatened party and then by telling the caller of
68
their duty to warn. Fifty percent of the callers terminated contact.,
Whether any callers harmed themselves or others after prematurely terminating their calls to the suicide hotline can only be speculated; however,
this possibility represents another example of the potential deleterious effect of a lack of trust within the therapeutic setting that can result from the
possibility of breaches of confidentiality and the care that must be taken in
balancing psychiatric confidentiality with protection of third parties.
63.
Max Siegel, Privacy, Ethics and Confidentiality, PROF. PSYCHOL., Apr. 1979, at
249, 253.
64.
Id.
65.
Beigler, supra note 57, at 278 (describing the lack of spontaneity in therapy due
to discussions about confidentiality, therapists' anxiety about their responsibilities in assessing violence, and the resultant tendency to overpredict violence).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
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PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM DANGEROUS PATIENTS: LIMITS ON
THE RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIALITY

Despite the importance of confidentiality in the mental health treatment setting, a patient's right to privacy is not absolute but is "subject to
certain exceptions, which are ethically and legally justified because of overriding social considerations." 69 Specifically, the right to confidentiality
must be balanced against the right of the public at large to protection from
harm at the hands of violent patients. The American Medical Association
(AMA) endorses the principle that
[w]here a patient threatens to inflict serious bodily harm to
another person or to him or herself and there is a reasonable probability that the patient may carry out the threat,
the physician should take reasonable precautions for the
protection of the intended victim, including notification of
law enforcement authorities.70
This principle is congruent with the standard established in Tarasoff
that when a therapist reasonably determines "that a patient poses a serious
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.",71 Of note is the fact that neither the AMA principles nor the Tarasoff rule specifically establish a duty
to warn intended victims or to otherwise breach confidentiality. Instead,
they establish a duty to protect such victims, with warnings being only one
protective method available. Health care providers generally agree that confidentiality may properly be breached in some circumstances,7 2 and, in fact,
breaches are mandated in certain situations involving protection of the pubas the reporting of infectious diseases and child abuse, among othlic, such
73
ers.
One psychiatrist's decision to issue a protective warning was put to the
test when his patient sued him for medical malpractice and invasion of privacy after the doctor warned police and the patient's intended victim of the
patient's homicidal impulses.74 The patient, Mr. Viviano, was referred to
the psychiatrist, Dr. Stewart, for medication to treat depression.75 Viviano
had been injured in the course of his employment and had won a jury ver69.
Stewart, supra note 15 (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHIcs §
5.05, at 60-61 (2002-2003 ed. 2002)).
70.
Id.
71.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
72.
Beigler, supra note 57, at 278.
Id. at 277.
73.
Viviano v. Moan, 93-1368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/94); 645 So. 2d 1301.
74.
Id. at 2, 645 So. 2d at 1303.
75.
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dict of over $1 million, but the judge in his case had overturned the verdict
and ordered a retrial.76 During the course of treatment with Dr. Stewart,
while the retrial of the injury case was pending, Viviano made gradually
escalating threats against the trial judge, his attorney, and one of the attorneys for the defendants.77 Dr. Stewart was concerned that the patient's
threats were credible and likely to be carried out, especially after Viviano
reported "that he had watched the judge, could see into her home, and knew
where'''78she parked; he chronicled her morning 'routine,' including her
,jog.
The psychiatrist was not successful in dealing with Viviano's violent impulses therapeutically, since the patient had begun abusing drugs,
had become noncompliant with his prescribed psychiatric medication, and
had begun missing his scheduled appointments.7 9 In addition, involuntary
hospitalization was not an option; although Viviano had a mental illness in
the form of depression, his "repeated threats to murder Judge Wicker grew
not out of his depression but out of pure rage and anger, the result of her
80
vacating the $1.225 million judgment that had been rendered in his favor."
Dr. Stewart consulted with colleagues and with attorneys, and all agreed
that the judge should be notified of the patient's homicidal intentions toward her.8 1 The judge was warned and Viviano was arrested.82 Of note is
the fact that Viviano was armed when police detained him.83 Viviano was
tried for attempted murder, pled guilty to obstructing justice, was fined, and
was sentenced to a private psychiatric hospital, after which he sued both the
psychologist and the psychiatrist for malpractice.8 4 The doctors prevailed at
trial and on appeal. 85
It would be easy to rationalize that the favorable outcome for the judge
in the Viviano case in and of itself justified any breach of confidentiality
necessary to achieve that outcome. However, it must be noted that the
court's analysis in finding in favor of the clinicians went further than simple

76.
Stewart, supra note 15 (recounting the author's experience as the defendant in
the Viviano malpractice action in an article advocating for exceptions to the principle of
patient confidentiality).
77.

Viviano, 93-1368, p. 2; 645 So. 2d at 1303.

78.
Stewart, supra note 15.
79.
Id.
80.
Viviano, 93-1368, p. 8; 645 So. 2d at 1304 (explaining that state law governing
involuntary psychiatric hospitalization provides that the person being committed is dangerous as a result of a mental illness).
Stewart, supra note 15.
81.
Viviano, 93-1368, pp. 2-3; 645 So. 2d at 1303.
82.
83.
Stewart, supra note 15.
84.

85.

Viviano, 93-1368, p. 3, 645 So. 2d 1303.

Id. at 21,645 So. 2d at 1308.
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86
utilitarian reasoning that a life saved justifies a breach of confidentiality.
Plaintiffs argued that other protective measures should have been taken that
would have accomplished the same positive outcome for the judge while
the patient's confidentiality would have been maintained.8 7 Defendants
were able to prevail only after showing that they had exhausted other means
of protecting the judge before breaching confidentiality. 88 Specifically, they
demonstrated that medication and supportive therapy had failed due to
Viviano's increasing noncompliance8 9 and that hospitalization was impossible because Viviano did not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary
commitment to a psychiatric hospital. 90 Furthermore, the clinicians were
able to demonstrate the reasonableness of their belief in the credibility of
Viviano's threats against the judge as justification of the breach of confidentiality. 9 1
The Viviano case demonstrates the ideal application of the Tarasoff
duty to protect as merely an exception to the doctrine of patient confidentiality, applicable in only a narrow set of circumstances. First, the doctorpatient relationship between the clinicians and Viviano met the "special
relationship" criterion that is the basis of the duty. 92 Second, the increasingly frequent threats were evaluated within the treatment setting and were
deemed serious and credible enough to trigger the protective duty.9 3 Finally,
confidentiality was breached only after other measures, such as psychotherapy and medication, had failed to thwart the patient's violent impulses 94 and
after it became clear that involuntary hospitalization was impossible. 95
In many situations, however, this ideal outcome is blocked by confusion about the clinician's protective duty and its application. While the statutes in some states are clearer and subject to less problematic judicial inter-

86.
Id. at 19-20, 645 So. 2d at 1307 (explaining that the decision was based on the
totality of the evidence, including a balancing of the disclosure by the doctors against the
patient's right to privacy as well as expert testimony on the standard of care in all treatment
attempts prior to the disclosure).
87.
Id. at 7, 645 So. 2d at 1304.
88.
See Viviano, 93-1368; 645 So. 2d 1301 (finding Dr. Stewart's disclosure of
confidential information to be reasonable when balanced against Viviano's right to privacy
only after a thorough discussion of the reasons why other measures were impossible or ineffective).
89.
Stewart, supra note 15.
90.
See Viviano, 93-1368, p. 8; 645 So. 2d at 1304.
91.
Id. at 17, 645 So. 2d at 1307.
92.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
93.
Viviano, 93-1368, p. 17; 645 So. 2d at 1307 (referring to expert testimony that
"Judge Wicker was in imminent danger").
94.
Stewart, supra note 15.
95.
Viviano, 93-1368, p. 8; 645 So. 2d at 1304.
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pretation than those in other states, a complete analysis
and comparison of
96
all such statutes is beyond the scope of this article.
IV.

AFTERMATH OF TARASOFF

In the thirty years since the Tarasoffdecision, most states have enacted
statutes addressing the circumstances under which a mental health profes97
sional has a duty to protect third parties from potentially violent patients.
However, despite the attempt by the Tarasoff court to clearly define a
therapist's obligation to the public as a "duty to protect,, 98 to specify the
circumstances and events that would trigger the duty, 99 and to describe how
the duty could be fulfilled,' l° problems remained. Specifically, this attempt
apparently did not assist other states in writing clear and understandable
statutes, did not elucidate the duty in a way that was understandable and
useful to mental health professionals, and did not assist courts in interpreting the statutes in a way that accomplished the balance between confidentiality and public safety.101
A.

LEGISLATION

There is wide variation among states in the descriptions of the duty,
with the statutes falling into four general categories: those that explicitly
establish a duty, those that prohibit liability except under particular circumstances, those that seem to permit but not require disclosure, and those that
take other approaches.10 2 In states whose statutes clearly establish an affirmative duty with unambiguous wording, such as "a mental health professional has a duty," 10 3 there is little doubt about the existence of the duty.
Conversely, statutes in other states simply remove liability for failing to
96.
For this type of comparison, see Claudia Kachigian & Alan R. Felthous, Court
Responses to Tarasoff Statutes, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 263 (2004).
97.
Id. at 265.
98.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
99.
Id. at 345 ("[The duty is triggered] once a therapist does in fact determine, or
under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient
poses a serious danger of violence to others.").
100.
Id. at 340 (explaining that the duty may be discharged by undertaking to "warn
the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police,
or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances").
101.
Kachigian & Felthous, supra note 96, at 266-68 & tbl.1 (presenting, in Table 1,
a compilation of cases, by state, with judicial decisions categorized based on reference to
applicable "duty to protect" statutes and use of the statutes in the analysis; notably, many
courts did not reference applicable statutes or did not apply the statutes to their decisions).
102.
Id. at 265.
103.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (West
1999).
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protect third parties under some circumstances, stating, for instance, "[n]o
cause of action shall lie against a mental health services provider ...unless
•."104 and "[a] mental health professional... shall not be liable.., except
where ... ,.105 Other statutes seem to passively permit disclosure but do not
establish a clear affirmative duty, with wording such as "[t]he psychiatrist
may disclose patient communications"' 0 6 and "[t]he treating physician...
may communicate the threat."'' 0 7 Still other statutes have wording that is not
easily categorized as either requiring or permitting disclosure and places the
existence of any duty in doubt, with language such as "[a] mental health
professional... may be held liable.., only if...,,108
There is further disparity among states in the description of protected
parties as well as in the acceptable methods for discharging the duty. Most
states that impose an affirmative duty to protect third parties apply the duty
to any identified or reasonably identifiable subjects of a patient's threats, 10 9
but others require that the potential victim be specified or clearly identified
before the protective duty is triggered." 0 Requirements for fulfillment of
the duty vary from state to state, with some statutes mentioning only warnings and/or disclosures 1 ' and others referring to additional protective
a clinician's duty either in addition to or indemeasures that might fulfill
112
pendent of a warning.
B.

REACTIONS WITHIN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY

Reactions to the Tarasoff decision from those in the medical community showed confusion, with many psychiatrists throughout the United
States erroneously believing that the California court's decision applied
nationally. 1 3 This uncertainty in the medical community was further illusDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5402 (2003).
104.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
105.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059 (West 2007).
106.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-97 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
107.
108.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.51 (LexisNexis 2005).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2007); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059 (West
109.
2007); MICH.COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:35 (LexisNexis 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207
(2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2400.1 (2005).
110.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800:2 (2009).
111.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102
(2002).
112.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2005 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 330.1946 (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:35 (LexisNexis 2003);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2400.1 (2005).
113.
David T. Armitage, Legal Duties Involving Physicians, Patient and Third Parties: Part Two, ARMED FORCES INST. PATHOLOGY, May 1, 1995, at 3,
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trated by the fact that as late as 1984, more than seventy-five percent of
psychiatrists in one survey incorrectly believed that their duty to third parties was specifically to warn them, whereas only about thirty percent of
psychiatrists believed that they had a duty to use reasonable care to protect
third parties in a way other than warning them. 1 4 This misinformation persisted with eighty-five percent of therapists acknowledging awareness of
the Tarasoff decision
but admitting to confusion about what the law re15
quired of them.'
C.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Court decisions in many states also show a disquieting lack of predictability and uniformity in judicial application and interpretation of "duty to
protect" statutes. It is disturbing that even in states whose statutes and/or
case law delineate protective measures other than warnings, courts have
interpreted the statutes as imposing only a duty to warn. 1 6 In one multistate
analysis of cases involving potential protective disclosure issues, over
twenty-five percent of cases examined "did not mention the [applicable]
statute even with factual circumstances that would seemingly implicate
it,' ' 1 7 and over fifteen percent mentioned the applicable statute but failed to
use it in their analysis. 18 It is clear that despite the intention of the California Supreme Court in the Tarasoffdecision to balance a therapist's conflicting duties to his patient and to the public," 9 when other states attempted to
codify and interpret these same principles and when mental health professionals attempted to implement them, the letter of the law created so much
confusion that it obscured the spirit of the law.

http://healthnet.md.chula.ac.th/chulapatho/AFIP/AFIP%20fascicles/Afip-tumor%20of%2e
sophagus%20and%20stomach/afip-fasciclefs 18_text/www.afip.org/Departments/legalmed/openf
ile95/3rdpartypart2.pdf.
114.
Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers & Carolyn L. Blitch, Tarasoff: Myth and
Reality: An Empirical Study of PrivateLaw in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443,465-66 (1984).
115.
Buckner & Firestone, supra note 1, at 219.
116.
See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984);
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 733 (Cal. 1980) (misquoting Tarasoff as
imposing a "duty to warn"); Latimer v. Havenwyck Hosp., No. 255277, 2006 WL 445957, at
*1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006); Powell v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 749 A.2d 301, 305 (N.H.
2000).
117.
Kachigian & Felthous, supra note 96, at 268.
118.
Id. at 269.
119.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976) ("We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy ....Against this interest ....we must weigh the public
interest in safety from violent assault.").
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V.

ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS LAWS

Illinois is among the states whose statutes fall into the aforementioned
fourth category, "other approaches," with regard to its establishment of
protective duties. 120 Illinois has codified a mental health professional's duties to patients and to the public in two statutes: The Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) 12 and
the Miscellaneous Provisions chapter of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code). 2 2 These Illinois statutes
have proved especially problematic to judicial interpretation and application. For example, in their analyses of "duty to protect" situations, some
Illinois courts have referred only to case law and to the Restatement, failing
to mention either statute. 123 Other courts have based their decisions only on
the Confidentiality Act, ignoring the Mental Health Code. 124 A closer
analysis leads to the conclusion that there are possible solutions to the problems inherent in the existing Illinois statutes.
A.

CONFIDENTIALITY ACT

The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
(Confidentiality Act) protects a patient's right to privacy with respect to
mental health records. 2 5 The Act describes a set of circumstances in which
records may be disclosed, including situations involving abused or neglected children,126 initiation or continuation of inpatient psychiatric commitment hearings, 127 provision of emergency medical care to patients unable to consent to disclosure of information relevant to their care, l2 8 collection of payments from third parties for mental health care, 129 procurement
of internment sites for deceased patients,' 30 representation in judicial proceedings under the Mental Health Code,13 ' and compliance with requirements of the Census Bureau, 32 among others. When faced with potential
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
17, 1997).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Kachigian & Felthous, supra note 96, at 265.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 to 110/17 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-100 to 5/6-107 (2005).
E.g., Charleston v. Larson, 696 N.E.2d 793, 797-98 (111.App. Ct. 1998).
E.g., Chapa v. Adams, No. 94 C 2048, 1997 WL 414107, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(i) (Supp. 2008).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(ii) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
Id. at 110/1 l(iii).
Id. at 110/1 l(iv).
Id. at 110/11 (v).
Id. at l10/11(vi).
Id. at 110/11(vii).
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"duty to protect" situations, Illinois courts consistently look to subsection
viii of the Confidentiality Act, which provides that disclosures are allowed
"when, and to the extent, in the therapist's sole discretion, disclosure is
necessary to warn or protect a specific individual against whom a recipient
has made a specific threat of violence where there exists a therapist1 33
recipient relationship or a special recipient-individual relationship."
As discussed more fully below, a review of judicial interpretation and
application of the Confidentiality Act has highlighted three distinct problems. First, the Confidentiality Act does not create an affirmative requirement to disclose threatening communications but simply allows disclosure,
stating, "Records and communications may be disclosed." 134 That fact notwithstanding, courts refer specifically to an affirmative duty to third parties.1 35 Second, the Confidentiality Act allows disclosure to protect threatened individuals when a "therapist-recipient relationship or a special recipient-individual relationship" exists, 136 but courts interpret this as narrowing
the class of protected third parties,1 37 leaving many potential victims unnecessarily vulnerable. Third, although the Act allows disclosure when necessary to warn or protect an individual, courts repeatedly refer only to the
"duty to warn,"' 138 failing to mention any alternative protective measures
that would safeguard not just the welfare of the threatened party but also the
rights of the patient to confidentiality.
1.

Is There an Affirmative Duty?

The Confidentiality Act, which governs the circumstances under
which mental health records may be disclosed, does not establish an affirmative duty to disclose otherwise privileged communications but merely
excuses a clinician from liability if disclosure is made in a narrow range of
133.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(viii) (using the word "recipient" to refer to a patient receiving mental health services).
134.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (2002 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
135.
E.g., Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 421, 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
("The present action is predicated on the duties of the physicians ....); Eckhardt v. Kirts,
534 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("The plaintiff has failed to ...establish the
element of the duty ....).
136.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (viii).
137.
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 399 (Ill. 1997)
("[A] plaintiff cannot maintain a[n] ... action absent a direct physician-patient relationship
between [the] doctor and the plaintiff or a special relationship ... between the patient and
the plaintiff."); see also Tedrick, 869 N.E.2d at 430; Doe ex rel. Tanya S. v. N. Cent. Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 816 N.E.2d 4, 10 (Iil. App. Ct. 2004) (Holdridge, J.,concurring);
Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d. at 1344.
138.
Tedrick, 869 N.E.2d at 426; Tanya S., 816 N.E.2d at 9; Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d at
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circumstances specified in the statute.' 39 Notwithstanding the passively
permissive wording of the Confidentiality Act,' 4° Illinois courts have imposed an affirmative duty to disclose. For example, in a case involving disclosure of psychiatric records pursuant to a civil commitment hearing, the
court correctly cited the Confidentiality Act as providing that "[riecords and
communications may be disclosed"' 14 1 but went on to note that "[u]nder this
provision, [the mental health professional] had a duty to report [his patient's] activities."' 142 The Confidentiality Act is not intended to create a
duty in mental health professionals to disclose otherwise protected information; its goal is to maintain the "level of privacy necessary to encourage
other people to seek mental health treatment."' 143 Therefore, reliance on the
Confidentiality Act as the basis for establishing any affirmative disclosure
duty is misplaced.
2.

Who Are the Protected Parties?

The Confidentiality Act allows disclosure of psychiatric records or
communications if necessary to protect "a specific individual against whom
a recipient has made a specific threat of violence,"' 44 but only where either
of two types of special relationships exist: "a therapist-recipient relationship
or a special recipient-individual relationship."' 145 This implies a three-tiered
analysis: first, that the threat must be specific; second, that it must be directed toward an identified individual; and third, if those requirements are
met, that one of the two types of special relationship exists. 46 Historically,
"[t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him
a duty to take such action." 14 7 The existence of a special relationship between the actor and the third party represents an exception to the principle
that there is no duty to come to the aid of others. 148 The wording of the
Confidentiality Act is logically problematic, however, because it seems to
allow disclosure in order to safeguard the welfare of any person threatened
by a patient under a clinician's care; but the mention of the two varieties of
139.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(i)-(xii) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (2002 & Supp. 2008) ("Records and communica140.
tions may be disclosed ... ").
141.
Magnus v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 835 N.E.2d 77, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(citing 740 ILCS 110/11 (West 2002)).
Id. (emphasis added).
142.
143.
Doe v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'I Regulation, 793 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
144.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 1(viii).
Id.
145.
Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (I11.App. Ct. 1989).
146.
147.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
Id.§ 314A.
148.
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special relationships has been interpreted by Illinois courts as imposing
limitations on the class of protected parties rather than as triggering an exception to the "no duty to aid" rule.
Regarding the "special recipient-individual relationship,"'' 49 Illinois
courts have held that a clinician's duty is triggered if it is necessary to protect an individual with whom the patient himself has a special relationship. 50 A special relationship has been defined as one in which the parties
are intimately related. 15' For example, a protective duty existed between a
physician and the unborn child of his patient for harm resulting from a
blood transfusion 52 and between a physician and a patient's wife when the
patient carried out the threat to kill his wife. 153 The other category of relationship noted in the Confidentiality Act, the "therapist-recipient relationship," seems to refer simply to the relationship between the clinician and
the patient. However, Illinois courts interpret this phrase as permitting disclosure only if there is a physician-patient
relationship between the doctor
154
threat.
the
of
target
the
and
This interpretation was established in a case involving injury to an
automobile passenger, James Kirk, when the driver lost control of his car,
allegedly due to the effects of prescription medication; the passenger's
claims against the prescribing doctor failed because there was no relationship between the doctor and the passenger and, therefore, no protective duty
owed to the passenger. 55 Another court applied this principle in an action
brought by the administrator of the estate of a man killed by his wife
against the wife's psychiatrist. 56 The court noted that by "[a]pplying the
duty analysis set forth in Kirk to the facts of this case, it is clear that plaintiff's decedent had no direct physician-patient relationship with defendant." 157 Although it is true that neither the automobile passenger nor the
murdered husband had a physician-patient relationship with the respective
doctors, there was no need to analyze the facts of either case based on the
presence or absence of a doctor-patient relationship. That is, since neither
case involved a specific threat by the patient against an identified individ-

149.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11(viii).
150.
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 399 (111. 1997);
Eckhardt,534 N.E.2d at 1339.
151.
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (I11.1977).
152.
Id.
153.
Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 421, 430-31 (I11.App. Ct. 2007).
154.
Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 399 (emphasis added); Eckhardt,534 N.E.2d at 1344.
155.
Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
156.
Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d 1339.
157.
Id. at 1346 (Reinhard, J., concurring).
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ual, the analysis
should have stopped when these threshold requirements
158
were not met.
Although the distinctions may seem benign as applied in these cases,
using either the "special recipient-individual relationship" or the "therapistrecipient relationship" as determinative of the existence of a protective duty
to threatened parties may lead to unintended negative outcomes in other
situations. Specifically, under the Illinois standard, no protective duty exists
if a patient admits an intent to harm a readily identifiable third party who
has no relationship with the therapist or with the patient himself.159 Instead,
the duty exists only if the patient threatens to harm another person who also
has a physician-patient relationship with that same clinician or who is intimately related to the patient. 160 Concerned about this limitation on the class
of protected parties in Illinois, one judge pointed out the belief by the third
district that Illinois would adopt Tarasoffs reasoning and extend the protective duty to any foreseeable third parties. 161 Specifically, Justice Holdridge
stated, "I agree with the standard articulated in Tarasoff ... ; however, the
Illinois Supreme Court has declined to adopt it.' 162 The failure by Illinois
courts to adopt the Tarasoff standard leaves unprotected all potential victims of violent psychiatric patients who are not themselves patients of the
therapist who heard the threat or who are not intimately related to the patient making the threat. This is a direct contradiction of the protection established by the Tarasoffcourt. That is, the court specifically noted that it was
an unnecessary restriction to limit the duty to situations in which there existed "a special relationship both to the victim and to the person whose conduct created the danger." 163 Instead, the court noted that "the single relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to support the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating from the patient's illness."' 164 Therefore, if Tarasoffhad been judged based on the Illinois special relationship criteria, the court would have found no duty for the
physicians to protect Tatiana Tarasoff since she lacked both the requisite
intimate relationship with Poddar and the "direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and [the] plaintiff." 165 Furthermore, the Illinois
158.
Although the decision in Eckhardt was ultimately based on the lack of a clear
threat against an identified party, much discussion was devoted to the "special relationship"
aspect of the test. See Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d 1339.
159.
See Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 399; Id. at 1344.
160.
See Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d at 1346 (Reinhard, J., concurring).
161.
Doe ex rel. Tanya S. v. N. Cent. Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 816 N.E.2d 4, 10
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (Holdridge, J., concurring) (referring to the court's belief as expressed in
Novak v. Rathnam, 505 N.E.2d 773, 775 (I11.App. Ct. 1987)).
162.
Id. at 10.
163.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
164.
Id.
165.
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 399 (Ill. 1997).
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analysis would have forced the Viviano' 6 6 court to find Dr. Stewart liable
for breach of confidentiality based on his disclosure to Judge Wicker because the judge had neither an intimate relationship with the violent patient
nor a doctor-patient relationship with Dr. Stewart.
More disturbing than hypothetical negative outcomes is the result in a
recent case in which parents of sexually abused children brought a negligence action against the mental health clinic that treated the perpetrator, a
minor who lived in the same apartment complex as the victims. 167 The
clinic did not alert parents of neighboring children about the perpetrator's
violent tendencies, despite his admission that he had previously been abusing other children in the apartment building. 168 In affirming the lower
court's dismissal of the claim against the clinic, the court noted,
"[A]lthough David made specific threats of violence, and the violence was
directed against a readily identifiable set of victims, there was no direct
physician-patient relationship between the Clinic and the victims, nor was
there a special relationship between David and the victims. ' 169 If Illinois
had adopted the Tarasoff standard extending protection to any readily identifiable third parties, this standard would have "warrant[ed] a reversal in the
instant case." 170 Unfortunately, the lack of this wider standard of protection
left the abused children without legal recourse.
3.

What Protective Measures Fulfill the Duty?

Even more serious than the confusion about the existence of an affirmative duty and the lack of clarity about which parties are protected is
the frequent mischaracterization of the duty as a "duty to warn." 171 The
Confidentiality Act allows disclosure of confidential information by a
therapist when "disclosure is necessary to warn or protect."172 The importance of distinguishing between warning and protection is related to the
particularly crucial nature of patient confidentiality within the mental health
treatment setting and the especially deleterious consequences of unnecessarily revealing a patient's psychiatric problems. 173 It must be noted that
issuing a warning to the intended victim of a violent patient is only one way
to protect the threatened party; numerous alternative measures exist that
would still safeguard the threatened party but would also allow patient con166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Viviano v. Moan, 93-1368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/94); 645 So. 2d 1301.
Tanya S., 816 N.E.2d 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10 (Holdridge, J., concurring).
E.g., Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Il1.App. Ct. 1989).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(viii) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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fidentiality to be maintained. 174 Therefore, any duty owed by mental health
professionals to the public is better characterized as a "duty to protect,"
with warnings being viewed as only one among many methods of fulfilling
the protective duty.
Despite the distinction between warnings and other protective measures and the separate references to warning and protection contained in the
Confidentiality Act, Illinois courts repeatedly mischaracterize the clinician's duty as a "duty to warn," ignoring the fact that issuing a warning %is
not the only way that protection of the public may be achieved. For example, many Illinois courts specifically cite Tarasoff and discuss the importance of the case in establishing a psychotherapist's duty toward third par175
ties but then erroneously quote Tarasoffas establishing a "duty to warn.
The Tarasoff court was careful to describe the duty not as a duty to warn
but as "a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim. ' 176 Also of note is the fact that the Tarasoff court does not hold that
warning the would-be victim is the only way to fulfill the duty but instead
explicitly asserts that "discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily
vary with the facts of each case . . . [and] must be measured against...
reasonable care under the circumstances." 177 Although this distinction was
made too late to save Tarasoff from a violent death at the hands of Poddar,
the importance of the difference between warning and protection is illustrated by the court's observation that after confidentiality was breached and
police were called, "Poddar broke off all contact with the hospital staff and
discontinued psychotherapy. From those facts, one could reasonably infer
that defendants' actions led Poddar to halt treatment which, if carried
through, might have led him to abandon his plan to kill [Tarasoff]. ' 78
The likelihood that breaches of confidentiality will cause patients to
discontinue treatment that might otherwise help them to control their violent impulses underscores the importance of using alternative therapeutic
modes of dealing with patient violence-breaching confidentiality by warn-

174.
For a complete discussion of alternative protective measures, see infra Part
V.C.3.
175.
See Tanya S., 816 N.E.2d at 10 (Holdridge, J., concurring) (quoting the belief by
the Novak court that Illinois should adopt Tarasoff's "duty on therapists to warn foreseeable
third parties"); Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d at 1342 ("Tarasoff dealt with the duty to warn.");
Novak v. Rathnam, 505 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("We note that Tarasoff dealt
with the duty to warn ... [and] we believe Illinois would adopt Tarasoff's affirmative duty.
to warn.").
176.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis
added).

177.

Id.

178.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 559 (Cal. 1974), vacated,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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ing police or potential victims is only a last resort. 179 It is apparent that Illinois courts do not draw this important distinction. That is, the Illinois Supreme Court has noted its adoption of the Restatement of Torts's analysis of
the duty to protect the public from criminal attacks.1 80 The Restatement
imposes liability on any party who "render[s] services to another... necessary for the protection of a third person...
[and who fails to] exercise rea181
sonable care to protect his undertaking."'
, In applying the Restatement's language to a case in which a psychiatric patient carried out his threat to kill his wife, 182 the court interchanged the
ideas of protection and warning, failing to note the different outcomes that
might have been achieved under both alternatives. Specifically, after discharge from inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, a patient presented at an
outpatient follow-up appointment claiming that he was going to kill his
wife and asking to be re-admitted to inpatient treatment.' 83 When the patient
suddenly changed his mind about hospitalization and asked to be allowed to
return home to his wife, clinic personnel allowed him to leave and simply
referred the patient to his family physician, who advised the patient to seek
psychiatric care. 184 Three days later, the patient strangled his wife to death

and attempted suicide by overdose.' 85 Although the patient survived the
suicide attempt, he required amputation of both legs below the knee "because of the way his body was positioned during the period following his
ingestion of the medication."'' 86 In its analysis of any duty owed by clinic
personnel to the deceased wife, the court used the language of the Restatement, noting that the wife was harmed by "the defendants' failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of their undertakings,"' 187 but it mischaracterized this duty of care as imposing "a duty to warn [the wife] about
the violent propensities of her husband.'' 188 Although the court found the
outpatient clinic negligent, providing damages to the estate of the deceased
wife and her children, it is important to note the difference in potential outcomes in the absence of negligence depending on whether the duty was for
the clinic to warn the wife or to protect her. The court specifically characterized the duty in this case as a duty to warn the wife about her husband's
179.
GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 12 ("Other measures can be taken
without breaching confidentiality and should ordinarily be considered first.").
180.
Pippin v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 399 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ill. 1979).
181.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 324A (1965).
182.
Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 421 (I11.App, Ct. 2007).
183.
Id. at 424.
184.
Id. at 425.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id. at 429.
188.
Tedrick, 869 N.E.2d at 429.
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violent impulses.1 89 Since the wife was already aware of her husband's
threats against her and had, in fact, expressed her concern to clinic staff
over her husband's moods and behavior, 190 there is no indication that warning her of violent impulses about which she was already aware would have
saved her life. However, if the duty was applied consistent with the Restatement's wording as a duty to "exercise reasonable care to protect," 19'
measures other than warnings would have been considered, especially
where a warning would be ineffective in light of the would-be victim's
prior awareness of the threats against her life. One protective measure that
might have fulfilled a duty to protect is involuntarily hospitalization. This
option is possible when a patient's violent threats are the direct result of a
mental illness 192 and it is expected that treatment of the underlying mental
illness will alleviate the patient's violent impulses. If the patient had been
hospitalized and his suicidal and homicidal impulses subsided as his psychiatric disorder was effectively treated, the outcome would certainly have
been better for his wife, since she would not have been killed. Furthermore,
it would have been better for the patient as well, since the protective environment of the hospital would likely have prevented his suicide attempt,
thus saving the patient from below-the-knee amputations. In addition, hospitalization also would have prevented the murder of his wife and the resulting legal charges and penal or psychiatric incarceration, as well as prevented the possible emotional repercussions of his actions.
Extending this reasoning to its logical conclusion, if Illinois courts correctly characterize the duty as a "duty to protect," congruent with the language of the Confidentiality Act, the Tarasoff decision, and the Restatement-all sources cited by Illinois courts in their analyses-protective
measures other than warnings would also fulfill the protective duty and
would provide the possibility of positive outcomes impossible with warnings alone.
B.

MENTAL HEALTH CODE

The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental
Health Code) releases physicians, clinical psychologists, and qualified examiners from liability for "failure to warn of and protect from a recipient's
threatened or actual violent behavior except where the recipient has communicated to the person a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims."' 93 The practitioner is exempt from
189.
190.

Id.
Id at 425.

192.

Estate of Johnson v. Condell Mem'l Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ill. 1988).
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(b) (2005).

191.

193.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
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liability after making a good-faith attempt to fulfill the duty via "a reasonable effort to communicate the threat to the victim and to a law enforcement
agency,
or by a reasonable effort to obtain the hospitalization of the recipi194
ent."
The wording of the Mental Health Code is less problematic than that
of the Confidentiality Act in regard to the creation of an affirmative duty,
the classification of the protected parties, and the fulfillment of the protective duty. First, although neither the Confidentiality Act nor the Mental
Health Code specifically and clearly establish an affirmative duty to protect
the public from violent psychiatric patients, the language of the Mental
Health Code stating that "there shall be no liability ...[for] failure to [warn
of and] protect ... except where ... 195 seems more affirmative than the
passive language of the Confidentiality Act, which reads, "[r]ecords .. .
may be disclosed."' 96 That is, "no liability ...except where. . ." creates the
inference that there is liability if the specified conditions are met. Therefore, the Mental Health Code would have provided a logical basis upon
which Illinois courts could have relied in their imposition of an affirmative
protective duty. 197
With regard to defining the protected parties, the Mental Health Code
protects any "reasonably identifiable victim or victims . . . [against whom a
patient has made] a serious threat of physical violence."'198 This language is
consistent with the language of Tarasoff, which is frequently cited by Illinois courts' 99 and which requires protection by the clinician "not only of the
patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows to be
threatened by the patient. '' 2 00 If the court in the Tanya S. case 20 1 had relied
on the expansive protection provided by the Mental Health Code rather than
on the restricted protection offered by the Confidentiality Act, 20 2 the sexually abused children, who were readily identifiable and specifically threatened,2 °3 would have been provided the legal recourse denied to them under
the Confidentiality Act.
194.
Id. at 5/6-103(c).
195.
Id. at 5/6-103(b).
196.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
197.
E.g., Magnus v. Dep't of Prof I Regulation, 835 N.E.2d 77 (111. App. Ct. 2005).
198.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(viii).
199.
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Tanya S. v. N. Cent. Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 816
N.E.2d 4, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (Holdridge, J., concurring) (referring to the duty owed to
"foreseeable third parties"); Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (II1. App. Ct. 1989)
(referring to the duty owed to "foreseeable third parties"); Novak v. Rathnam, 505 N.E.2d
773, 775 (I11.
App. Ct. 1987) (noting the duty owed to "a readily identifiable victim").
200.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
201.
Tanya S., 816 N.E.2d 4.
202.
See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
203.
Tanya S.,816 N.E.2d at 9.
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Regarding the specific methods for fulfilling the protective duty, the
Mental Health Code is preferable to the Confidentiality Act in this regard as
well. That is, although the Confidentiality Act permits disclosures when
necessary to "warn or protect," it gives no examples of what protective
measures, other than warning, might fulfill the duty. 2°4 The Mental Health
Code, on the other hand, permits disclosures when necessary to "warn of
and protect ' 20 5 and elaborates on methods of discharging the duty, including "making a reasonable effort to communicate the threat to the victim and
to a law enforcement agency, or by a reasonable effort to obtain the hospitalization of the recipient. ' 2°6 Although there are more protective measures
available to clinicians besides warning the intended victim and hospitalizing a violent patient,2°7 the Mental Health Code introduces some guidance
as to alternatives to breaches of confidentiality. 20 8 It is important to note
that if the Mental Health Code had been consistently cited by Illinois courts
in their descriptions of a mental health professional's duty, the Tedrick2°9
case may have had a more favorable outcome for all parties involved. Specifically, as previously discussed, involuntary hospitalization of the patient
in Tedrick would likely have provided the protective environment necessary
to prevent the patient from acting on his violent compulsions and murdering
his wife, as well as to prevent him from the suicide attempt that ultimately
caused the amputation of his legs.210
It is disturbing to note that despite the more favorable results that
could be achieved by application of the Mental Health Code, Illinois courts,
inexplicably, have neither cited nor applied this statute in their analyses of
situations involving a clinician's duty to protect the public.21 In fact, the
204.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(viii) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
205.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(b) (2005).
206.
Id. at 5/6-103(c).
207.
For a complete discussion of the possible hierarchy of protective measures, see
infra Part V.C.3.
208.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(c) (2005) (noting that a reasonable effort to hospitalize the patient is one method of fulfilling the clinician's duty).
209.
Tedrick v. Cmty. Res. Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
210.
See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
211.
See Magnus v. Dep't of Prof 1 Regulation, 835 N.E.2d 77, 86 (I11.App. Ct.
2005) (citing the Confidentiality Act and not the Mental Health Code in situations involving
protective duties); Doe v. I11.Dep't of Prof 1 Regulation, 793 N.E.2d 119, 126 (I11.App. Ct.
2003) (citing the Confidentiality Act and not the Mental Health Code in situations involving
protective duties). For cases citing only Tarasoff,other case law, or the Restatement of Torts
in situations involving protective duties, also see Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977); Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 421 (111.
App. Ct. 2007); Doe ex rel. Tanya S. v. North CentralBehavioral Health Systems, Inc., 816
N.E.2d 4 (M1.App. Ct. 2004); Charleston v. Larson, 696 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998);
Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); and Novak v. Rathnam, 505 N.E.2d
773 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
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only case that cites this section of the Mental Health Code at all cites subsection (a), which releases a clinician from liability for statements made on
a certificate for involuntary admission if such statements were made in
good faith.2 12 However, this court's reference to the Mental Health Code
was not made for the purpose of clarifying the heretofore convoluted protective duty in the setting of threats to third parties but was made only for
the purpose of denying a party's request to raise the Code as part of his
argument on appeal, since he had not raised it in his argument at trial.213
C.

SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO ILLINOIS LAW

Illinois courts could eliminate the three major problems created by
their interpretation of "duty to protect" cases simply by basing their analyses on the wording of the Mental Health Code rather than on the Confidentiality Act with only slight amendments to the language of the Mental
Health Code. With these changes in place, Illinois could more effectively
strike a balance between a mental health professional's duty to maintain
patient confidentiality and the conflicting duty to protect third parties from
a patient's violent impulses.
1.

Clarificationof the Duty

Although the language of the Mental Health Code, "[t]here shall be no
liability on the part of ... [a] physician, clinical psychologist, or qualified
examiner . . . except where.., ,,214 is more indicative of an affirmative
duty than is the wording of the Confidentiality Act, "[r]ecords ... may be
disclosed,, 21 5 the Mental Health Code could be clarified further and
strengthened with only a slight modification. That is, changing the law to
read, "A physician, clinical psychologist or qualified examiner shall protect
reasonably identifiable victims from recipients where there has been a serious and credible threat of physical violence," leaves little doubt as to the
existence of an affirmative duty to act in the specified circumstances. This
change to more affirmative wording is consistent with the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics, which states, "'A physician shall
respect the rights of patients . . . .' '[But] [w]here a patient threatens to inflict serious bodily harm to another .... the physician should
take reason21 6
able precautions for the protection of the intended victim,.,
212.
Arthur v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 692 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
213.
Id.
214.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(b) (2005).
215.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/11 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
216. Stewart, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL EThics pmbl at xii, § 5.05, at 60-61 (2002-2003 ed. 2002).
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Furthermore, it is crucial to make clear that the duty owed by mental
health providers to threatened members of the public is to protect them, not
necessarily to warn them. 217 Although a warning might be appropriate in
some circumstances, as was the case in Viviano 218 where the physician had
already exhausted all other protective measures, warning is only one way of
fulfilling the protective duty. However, warning should never be the first
protective measure considered because breaches of confidentiality carry
with them the potential for damage to the therapeutic trust that is especially
vital within the mental health treatment setting. 21 9 Therefore, the current
Mental Health Code language, "to warn of and protect from,, 220 should be
amended to remove references to warning and to state only, "to protect
from."
2.

Expansion of ProtectedParties

The language of the Confidentiality Act, "where there exists a thera221
pist-recipient relationship or a special recipient-individual relationship,"
has been interpreted by Illinois courts as narrowing the class of protected
parties, resulting in a complete lack of protection or legal recourse for any
threatened parties who do not fall into one of the two narrow categories.222
This represents one important reason for restricting use of the Confidentiality Act to its intended area, protection of patient psychiatric records,223 and
not using it as the basis for analyzing cases involving protection of the public from violent patients. Instead, protection should be extended to any reasonably identifiable member of the public who is seriously threatened. This
can be accomplished by analyzing protective duty cases with reference to
the language of the Mental Health Code, which bases the protective duty on
the existence of "a serious threat
of physical violence against a reasonably
224
identifiable victim or victims.

217.
For a discussion of the distinction between protection and warning, and the
different outcomes that may be achieved under each option, see supra Part V.A.3.
218.
Viviano v. Moan, 93-1368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/94); 645 So. 2d 1301.
219.
See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
220.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(b) (2005).
221.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 l(viii) (2002 & Supp. 2008).
222.
Doe ex rel. Tanya S. v. N. Cent. Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 816 N.E.2d 4, 9
(I11.
App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the defendant was not liable for failing to protect sexually
abused children despite a specific threat of violence against a readily identifiable set of victims when there was "no direct physician-patient relationship ... nor was there a special
relationship between [the abuser] and the victims").
223.
Doe ex reL Tanya S. v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'1 Regulation, 793 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (explaining that the goal of the Confidentiality Act is to insure the level of
privacy that will encourage patients to seek mental health treatment).
224.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(b).
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Judicial interpretation based on the Mental Health Code language,
which extends protection to any reasonably identifiable third party, is consistent with the protection extended by Tarasoff,25 which is frequently cited
by Illinois courts as the basis for a clinician's protective duty.226 Furthermore, the Mental Health Code language is similar to the language of statutes in other states,227 whose courts interpret such statutes as protecting
reasonably identifiable parties. 228 Use of the Mental Health Code for judicial interpretation of protective duty cases would eliminate the unnecessarily restricted class of protected parties imposed by Illinois courts based on
their reference to the Confidentiality Act.
3.

Hierarchy of Protective Measures

Because of the particular importance of maintaining patient confidentiality within the psychiatric treatment setting and the potential for adverse
consequences when confidentiality is breached, 229 it is crucial that mental
health providers understand that their protective duty to the public can be
fulfilled in various ways without breaching confidentiality. Although there
are circumstances in which it is appropriate to warn a potential victim of a
patient's threat, "the duty to protect is not synonymous with a duty to warn.
Other measures can be taken without breaching confidentiality and should
ordinarily be considered first. ... ,,230 The Mental Health Code already contains language indicative of the fact that protective measures other than
warnings will satisfy a clinician's duty to protect the public. 23 1 This language could be expanded by including additional alternative measures in a
hierarchical format with issuance of a warning being seen as a last resort.
225.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
226.
See, e.g., Tanya S., 816 N.E.2d at 10 (Holdridge, J., concurring); Eckhardt v.
Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989); Novak v. Rathnam, 505 N.E.2d 773, 775
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987). All of the foregoing cases cite Tarasoff as the basis for extending protection to reasonably identifiable parties.
227.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059
(West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1946 (West 1999); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.51 (LexisNexis 2005). All of the
foregoing statutes protect clearly or reasonably identifiable parties.
See, e.g., Mavroudis v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
228.
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Evans v. Morehead
Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Paul v. Plymouth Gen. Hosp., 408
N.W.2d 492, 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling
Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1330 (Ohio 1997).
229.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
230.
GuTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 12.
231.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-103(c) (2005) ("Any duty ... shall be discharged by.
making a reasonable effort to communicate the threat to the victim and to a law enforcement agency, or by a reasonable effort to obtain the hospitalization of the recipient.").
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The first protective step on the proposed hierarchy involves measures
that may be taken as part of the patient's current treatment, such as "changing the nature of therapy to focus on the feared violence, adding or changing medications, [or] expanding therapy to include a threatened intimate of
the patient' s.' 232 These initial protective steps will allow the clinician to
exercise reasonable professional judgment in assessing the seriousness of
the patient's violent impulses and determining the effectiveness of continued outpatient therapy in addressing the patient's feelings.23 3
The second suggested step involves use of the therapeutic alliance to
form an agreement between therapists and patients under which patients
agree to comply "in order to protect themselves rather than those at risk. 2 34
That is, patients can be reminded of the legal consequences of acting on
violent impulses and of the advantages in refraining from doing so; within
the setting of trust in the therapist, patients may agree to allow the therapist
to implement specific protective measures, such as235supervision by a trusted
person or more frequent contact with the therapist.
The third recommended step involves the use of crisis counseling or
assertive community treatment programs available through some outpatient
treatment clinics 236 or a short term observational detention, such as the seventy-two-hour program initially sought for the potentially violent patient in
Tarasoff.237 Since the records pertaining to these services are subject to the
same confidentiality requirements as all other psychiatric records, the patient's confidentiality would be safeguarded while providing the closer
monitoring necessary to prevent the patient from acting on any violent impulses.
The fourth step involves voluntary hospitalization of the patient.238
This measure is possible when the patient consents to the clinician's recommendation for inpatient treatment, so it is a natural result of the establishment of therapeutic trust necessary for successful psychiatric treatment. 239 The protective environment of the inpatient setting safeguards the
would-be victim while at the same time protecting the patient from the consequences of his violent impulses.
232.
GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 13.
233.
See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) ("[T]he
therapist is free to exercise his or her own best judgment without liability .....
234.
Kipnis, supra note 17.
235.
Id. (referring to various monitoring interventions and protective measures patients might agree to accept within the therapeutic setting).
236.
See Janet Wattles Center: Treating Mental Illness in Rockford,
http://www.janetwattles.org/adult.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2009), for an example of one
provider's services.
237.
Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 341.
238.
See GuTHEiL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 13.
239.
See discussion supra Part HI.A.
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The fifth suggestion is to involuntarily hospitalize the patient. Although this represents a restriction of the patient's liberty since it must be
done against the patient's wishes, there are safeguards in place to prevent
unnecessary hospitalization. For example, when a patient is taken to a hospital emergency department for evaluation for possible psychiatric hospitalization, a petition is completed setting forth detailed reasons why hospitalization is being sought. The petition must be accompanied by a certificate
completed by the emergency department physician or qualified mental
health professional validating the necessity of involuntary hospitalization. 24 1 Furthermore, the patient must be "suffering from a mental illness..

. that ...may... cause him to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or

another., 242 If these criteria are met, the patient may be transferred from the
emergency department to a psychiatric hospital. Upon admission, a second
validating certificate must be completed by a licensed psychiatrist within
twenty-four hours, or the patient must be released.243 Hospitalizing a potentially violent patient can be viewed as restricting the patient's freedom to
the extent necessary to protect the intended victim from the patient's violent
urges and to protect the patient from the results of his impulsive actions.
Finally, if other protective measures have been tried and exhausted or
if hospitalization is impossible, as was the case in Viviano where the patient's violent threats toward the judge were not the result of a mental illness but were simply the result of his uncontrolled anger at her, 2 " the victim should be warned and/or law enforcement personnel should be notified.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although patient confidentiality is the cornerstone of physician-patient
trust in all branches of medicine, it is particularly crucial in psychiatry because of the stigma associated with mental illnesses, the sensitive and potentially embarrassing nature of the topics discussed in the mental health
treatment setting, and the possible adverse consequences of unnecessary
breaches of confidentiality. The duty of physicians and other mental health
professionals to maintain confidentiality is not absolute, however, and there
are times when this duty conflicts with the equally compelling duty to protect members of the public from potential harm by patients. The rights of
patients to confidentiality must be weighed against the rights of the public
to be free from serious injury or endangerment. Since the 1976 landmark
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

GuTHEiL & APPELBAUM, supra note 48, at 13.
Estate of Johnson v. Condell Mem'l Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 37, 40 (111. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Viviano v. Moan, 93-1368, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/94); 645 So. 2d 1301,

20091

PROTECTIVE PRIVILEGE VERSUS PUBLIC PERIL

Tarasoff case, in which the California Supreme Court held that mental
health professionals have a duty to protect readily identifiable victims from
credible threats at the hands of their patients,245 many states have codified a
similar duty and have cited Tarasoff as the basis for judicial interpretation
of similar cases. Interpretation of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act has resulted in confusion about the
existence of an affirmative duty, an overly restricted definition of the class
of protected parties, and the potential for unnecessary breaches of confidentiality based on lack of specificity about how the protective duty may be
fulfilled. These problems could be minimized or alleviated if courts interpreted "duty to protect" cases via the Illinois Mental Health Code instead of
via the Confidentiality Act, with only minor modification to the Mental
Health Code being necessary. If Illinois makes the changes necessary to
clarify the mental health professional's protective duty and to reinforce the
principle that the duty to protect is not limited to the duty to warn, these
steps may bring Illinois courts closer to achievement of the delicate balance
between patient confidentiality and public protection. It is this scenario that
will produce the best possible outcome for patients, mental health providers, and the public.
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